Class Problem!:  Why the Inconsistent Application of Rule 23\u27s Class Certification Requirements During Overbreadth Analysis is a Threat to Litigant Certainty by Berman, David I.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 1 Article 10 
2018 
Class Problem!: Why the Inconsistent Application of Rule 23's 
Class Certification Requirements During Overbreadth Analysis is a 
Threat to Litigant Certainty 
David I. Berman 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David I. Berman, Class Problem!: Why the Inconsistent Application of Rule 23's Class Certification 
Requirements During Overbreadth Analysis is a Threat to Litigant Certainty, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 253 
(2018). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss1/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 253 
NOTES 
CLASS PROBLEM!:  WHY THE INCONSISTENT 
APPLICATION OF RULE 23’S CLASS 
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS DURING 
OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS IS A THREAT TO 
LITIGANT CERTAINTY 
David I. Berman* 
 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is home to the class action 
device.  It is well-documented that this rule significantly impacts our legal 
system.  As a result, the need for its effective utilization has been apparent 
since its introduction.  Despite this, federal courts have inconsistently 
applied the rule during their analyses of overbroad class definitions at the 
class certification stage.  Consequently, parties involved in such litigation 
have been exposed to unnecessary costs and the potential for forum 
shopping. 
Nonetheless, this judicial inconsistency has gone largely unrecognized 
because it does not implicate the results of class certification.  Hence, courts 
here must first recognize the general need for uniformity before a precise 
standard for overbreadth analysis may be chosen.  Only then, this Note 
argues, may the aforementioned detrimental consequences be avoided. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of 
Mexico.1  This catastrophe caused deaths, injuries, and a massive discharge 
of oil into the Gulf Coast.2  BP, which leased the oil rig at the time, faced 
potential legal claims from numerous victims who were desperate for 
immediate relief.3  Facing such obvious and dramatic harm, the victims could 
 
 1. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 795–96 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See, e.g., Rachel Guillory, Remembering the Victims and Survivors of Deepwater 
Horizon, OCEAN CONSERVANCY (Oct. 1, 2016), https://oceanconservancy.org/blog/2016/10/ 
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have filed a motion in federal court to certify a class action suit against BP 
for the company’s negligence with regard to this incident.4 
However, had they done so, a district court may have then denied their 
motion on the grounds that the proposed class definition included a 
substantial number of individuals without legitimate causes of action.5  
Specifically, a court may have felt that sufficient commonalities did not exist 
among the class members or that it could not identify the injured class 
members from the class definition.6  Nevertheless, the plaintiffs would have 
been able to successfully appeal the decision if this district court had 
demonstrated imprecise analysis in its decision. 
Ultimately, if many illegitimate claimants were indeed included in the 
class definition, a district court’s denial of class certification may very well 
have been the just result.  The victims would have been able to bring 
individual claims against BP and the courts would have been better able to 
deal with their individualized suits.7  Still, if the district court had erred in 
this analysis, the plaintiffs would have been extensively delayed in obtaining 
their relief if they decided to appeal the decision.8  Under this scenario, such 
an unnecessary delay would have been avoided if the district court had 
initially applied appropriate scrutiny. 
While courts must make correct decisions, this example illustrates the need 
for courts to, at least, make consistent decisions if legal disputes are to be 
effectively managed.9  Justice John Marshall Harlan, for one, particularly 
commanded that the implementation of a clear set of rules enables individuals 
to “settle their differences in an orderly, predictable manner.”10  He added 
that “social organization and cohesion” are unattainable without such a 
system.11  Hence, as he framed it, the key to a legal system’s effectiveness is 
the uniform application of its rules.12  Consequently, the 1938 enactment of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and their subsequent adoption 
 
01/remembering-the-victims-and-survivors-of-deepwater-horizon/ [https://perma.cc/2RYD-
KAFM]. 
 4. The following hypothetical is based on procedural events that occurred in Byrd v. 
Aaron’s, Inc., No. 11-101, 2017 WL 4326106 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017), adopted by 2017 WL 
4269715 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2017). 
 5. Motions for class certification will be denied where proposed class definitions include 
a substantial number of uninjured members. See infra text accompanying notes 202–09. 
 6. See, for example, infra Part II.A.1.a for an analogous instance of improper class 
certification analysis. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 205–08. 
 8. See generally Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. 
L.J. 507, 511 (1987). 
 9. See generally Aleardo Zanghellini, The Foundations of the Rule of Law, 28 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 213 (2016). 
 10. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound 
Procedural System:  The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 86–87 (1997). 
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demonstrates our society’s enthusiasm for this societal model of consistent 
and uniform application of rules.13 
Rule 23’s class certification requirements, as alluded to above, encapsulate 
the importance of consistently applied FRCP.14  Specifically, the Rule is 
home to a powerful procedural tool known as the class action.15  As 
evidenced, the class action device serves as a method of representative 
litigation that enables people to join together to adjudicate their similar 
claims.16  In turn, this consolidation promotes efficiency by preserving scarce 
judicial resources and fairness by ensuring consistent legal determinations.17  
However, such efficient and fair outcomes only result where class members 
sufficiently share common interests.18  The Rule calls this requirement 
“predominance.”19  Likewise, class definitions must refer to objective criteria 
for parties to discern who will be bound by the potential judgments.20  Courts 
have called this requirement “ascertainability.”21  The consistent application 
of the Rule’s predominance and ascertainability requirements helps ensure 
its effectiveness.22 
Alarmingly, despite the Rule’s seeming clarity, courts have not uniformly 
utilized these requirements during analysis of overbroad class definitions, 
which has become a major roadblock for plaintiffs seeking class 
certification.23  Overbroad class definitions contain too many individuals 
with illegitimate claims for liability.24  While courts consistently deny 
certification where substantial overbreadth exists, some do so by way of 
predominance analysis25 while others do so through an analysis of 
 
 13. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Establish Uniformity, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/federal-rules-civil-procedure-establish-uniformity 
[https://perma.cc/TXA5-6SNZ] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 15. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (5th ed. 2011).  This 
Note will focus on Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiff class actions. 
 16. See Daniel Luks, Note, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit:  Name That Class 
Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2362 (2014). 
 17. See generally id. 
 18. See generally Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 19. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:47; Myriam Gilles, Note, Class Dismissed:  
Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 305, 311 (2010). 
 20. See 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:2 (14th ed. 
2017). 
 21. See Gilles, supra note 19, at 312. 
 22. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19. 
 23. Compare In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 257 (2d Cir. 2017), Webb v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 2017) (analyzing overbreadth under the 
predominance requirement), and Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 
2012), with Brecher v. Argentina, 806 F.3d 22, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2015) (analyzing overbreadth 
under the ascertainability requirement), EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 359 (4th Cir. 
2014), and Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 861 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 24. See Geoffrey C. Shaw, Note, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2383 (2015).  
Here, “illegitimate” means claimants with no injury and claimants that, while otherwise 
injured, do not have an injury contemplated by the scope of the proposed class definition. 
 25. See, e.g., Mazza, 666 F.3d at 596; see also Circle Click Media LLC v. Regus Mgmt. 
Grp. LLC, No. 3:12-CV-04000-SC, 2015 WL 6638929, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015). 
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ascertainability.26  Irrespective of how this distinction may impact the 
substantive elements of class certification, the mere existence of 
inconsistency causes confusion for litigants.27  Moreover, this same 
confusion results in unnecessary litigation costs and the potential for forum 
shopping.28  Rule 23’s significant impact on our legal system29 and on the 
economy exacerbates such concerns.30  Accordingly, this Note details a 
sparsely acknowledged judicial inconsistency issue that must be fixed to 
promote Rule 23’s effectiveness. 
Part I of this Note illustrates the background of the FRCP to show why 
their effectiveness depends on their consistent application.  This Part then 
focuses on Rule 23 and the associated overbreadth issue to demonstrate how 
inconsistent analysis creates the potential for litigant uncertainty.  Part II 
presents conflicting cases to show why overbreadth may be analyzed under 
either the predominance or ascertainability requirement.  In doing so, Part II 
details the litigation issues that arise from this divergence and explains how 
exactly this ensuing inconsistency inevitably produces detrimental 
consequences for litigants.  Finally, Part III explains that overbreadth should 
be consistently analyzed under the Rule’s predominance requirement to 
promote analytic clarity. 
I.  RULE 23 AND THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL CONSISTENCY 
The depths of this procedural landscape must be dissected to comprehend 
the importance of this analytic clarity issue.  Part I.A describes the 
background of the FRCP and the general need for uniformity in civil 
procedure to contextualize the concerns associated with inconsistent 
overbreadth analysis.  Next, Part I.B provides necessary context regarding 
Rule 23 and its class certification requirements.  Finally, Part I.C discusses 
why and how the overbreadth issue presents problems at the class 
certification stage. 
A.  The FRCP Need to Be Consistently Applied 
The FRCP, like any set of procedural rules, must be consistently applied 
in the courts for each rule to be effective.31  This is because procedural rules 
aim to ensure predictable process32 and certainty for litigants.33  Hence, 
consistently applied procedural rules enable litigants to efficiently structure 
 
 26. See, e.g., Carter v. PJS of Parma, Inc., No. 1:15 CV 1545, 2016 WL 3387597, at *2 
(N.D. Ohio June 20, 2016); see also Diacakis v. Comcast Corp., No. C 11-3002 SBA, 2013 
WL 1878921, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013). 
 27. See Shaw, supra note 24, at 2385. 
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:16. 
 30. See id. § 1:17. 
 31. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 32. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal 
Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 780 (1995). 
 33. See Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. 
REV. 683, 693 (2014). 
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their expectations of how courts will treat subsequent proceedings.34  As a 
result, parties ideally do not need to learn multiple interpretations of the same 
rule.35  This allows parties to save time, money, and effort.36  Conversely, 
litigation costs can vary drastically where courts’ applications of procedural 
rules diverge.37  This can happen when a court indicates that a party 
incorrectly interpreted a procedural rule due to the party’s reliance on 
inconsistent precedent38—for example, if the court has applied inconsistent 
overbreadth analysis during class certification.39 
Likewise, consistently applied FRCP promote fairness by encouraging 
resolutions based solely upon the merits of claims.40  Thus, when uniformly 
applied, the FRCP place desirable limits on forum shopping, which is the 
practice of seeking a litigation advantage by choosing a particular forum over 
another.41  Forum shopping exposes similarly situated parties to varying 
litigation opportunities solely because of how the different jurisdictions or 
judges interpret their respective or common procedural rules.42  This limits 
parties’ opportunities to construct the same claims and defenses.43  Of course, 
litigants should not be subjected to such arbitrary idiosyncrasies.44  Simply, 
this phenomenon is detested because of a ubiquitous “inchoate sense” against 
litigation results and costs that turn solely on the choice of forum.45 
Unsurprisingly, before the adoption of the FRCP, nonuniform procedural 
rules produced many problems for litigants.46  In particular, efficiency and 
fairness issues ensued as the federal courts adhered to the procedural rules of 
their respective states.47  This nonconformity wasted litigants’ resources and 
fortified an unjustifiably complicated system of rules.48  Lawyers who 
represented multistate corporations, for example, had difficulties practicing 
law due to persistent procedural inconsistencies.49  Predictably, this discord 
 
 34. See id. at 691. 
 35. See id. at 702. 
 36. See id. 
 37. For a discussion on whether state courts should follow the FRCP, see generally 
Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules:  A Survey of 
Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311 (2001). 
 38. See Meinders v. Emery Wilson Corp., No. 14-CV-596-SMY-SCW, 2016 WL 
3402621, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Ill. June 21, 2016) (discussing how the defendant incorrectly 
analyzed the predominance and ascertainability requirements). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 32, at 781. 
 41. See id. at 782. 
 42. See Markus Petsche, What’s Wrong with Forum Shopping?  An Attempt to Identify 
and Assess the Real Issues of a Controversial Practice, 45 INT’L LAW. 1005, 1027 (2011). 
 43. See Effron, supra note 33, at 693. 
 44. See id. at 691. 
 45. See Shrey Sharma, Note, Do the Second Circuit’s Legal Standards on Class 
Certification Incentivize Forum Shopping?:  A Comparative Analysis of the Second Circuit’s 
Class Certification Jurisprudence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 884 (2016). 
 46. See Subrin, supra note 12, at 100. 
 47. See Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 32, at 780. 
 48. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:  Uniformity, 
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002 (1989). 
 49. See id. 
2018] CLASS PROBLEM! 259 
led to the early twentieth-century enactment of the uniform system of 
procedural rules that govern civil proceedings in United States federal courts:  
the FRCP.50 
Today, the FRCP aim for “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action.”51  Certainly, the importance of predicable application is 
heightened in the context of Rule 23.52  Like other claim-determinative 
devices, the Rule’s consistent application safeguards litigants’ capacities to 
assert their claims and defenses.53  Thus, risks of litigant confusion, 
unnecessary litigation costs, and the potential for forum shopping remain 
heightened when courts inconsistently apply the Rule’s class certification 
requirements.54  As referenced, these risks also mirror those that existed 
before the enactment of the FRCP.55  The next section describes how Rule 
23’s impressive impact has intensified this need for judicial consistency. 
B.  The Background of Rule 23 
Rule 23 exemplifies prototypical representative litigation:56  the device 
ensures that sizable groups of people with common interests may enforce 
their legal rights.57  The Rule consolidates claims so that class representatives 
litigate on behalf of absent members.58  In turn, the parties, including the 
absent class members, are bound by the litigation.59  The device’s lure is 
evident as it prevents multiplicative actions that may result in inconsistent 
dispositions.60 
However, the Rule does produce risks via its mode of vicarious 
representation.61  Absent members, for example, may be inadequately 
represented where too many dissimilarities exist among proposed classes.62  
Equally troublesome is the potential for defendants to be adversely bound to 
claimants with feeble actions.63  Therefore, Rule 23 can operate as an 
exception to the “maxim” of personal litigation only by virtue of its 
 
 50. See Subrin, supra note 12, at 80. 
 51. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 52. See Effron, supra note 33, at 693. 
 53. See id.  A claim-determinative rule either allows or disallows claims to move forward.  
Thus, the denial of class certification may be the “death knell” for plaintiffs’ claims. See Erin 
L. Geller, Note, The Fail-Safe Class as an Independent Bar to Class Certification, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2773 (2013).  For defendants, the grant of class certification may 
produce pressure to “settle nonmeritorious claims” to evade the potential for transactional 
costs. See id. 
 54. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28. 
 55. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the litigation problems that led 
to the creation of the FRCP). 
 56. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:1. 
 57. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2362. 
 58. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:1. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. § 1:15. 
 61. See id. § 1:1; infra text accompanying notes 139–42. 
 62. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:1. 
 63. See supra text accompanying note 53; infra Part I.C. 
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procedural safeguards.64  Accordingly, the Rule’s requirements compel 
consistency65 to ensure its effectiveness—a point underscored by the drafters 
of the 1966 amendment.66 
Rule 23’s impressive impact on the courts67 and on the economy68 further 
highlights the importance of consistency.  To elucidate this point, consider 
that class actions compose a significant portion of annual federal court 
filings,69 that the device enables thousands of claims per year,70 and that Rule 
23 actions sweep across an array of subject matters.71  Moreover, these 
claims may take years to complete72 and involve numerous hours of motion 
practice and brief writing.73  Thus, even though the number of certified class 
actions remains small due to the Rule’s associated risks, Rule 23 suits result 
in billions of dollars being redistributed annually within the American 
economy.74 
Indeed, large financial settlements and judgments have led to 
extraordinary transaction costs for litigants as well.75  Plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
for example, are usually paid on contingencies that may reach 25 to 35 
percent of a class action’s gross recovery.76  This makes their time quite 
valuable.77  And defendants’ lawyers, who often represent corporations, may 
bill thousands of dollars per hour working on Rule 23 matters.78  Thus, a Rule 
 
 64. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:1. 
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 61–64. 
 66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (explaining how 
the Rule previously did not “provide an adequate guide to the proper extent of judgments”). 
 67. See Erin Coe, Federal Courts See Huge Rise in Class Actions, LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2008, 
12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/53273 [https://perma.cc/467T-HLEL]. 
 68. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:17. 
 69. See id. § 1:18. 
 70. See Coe, supra note 67. 
 71. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:18; see also Brian Fitzpatrick, An Empirical 
Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 
818 (2010) (explaining that Rule 23 actions involve claims ranging from securities fraud to 
civil rights). 
 72. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 71, at 820. 
 73. See, e.g., Jason Grant, Judge Slashes Fees, Offers Primer on Billing, in Cookbook 
Case, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 12, 2017, 4:02 PM), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ 
id=1202797828979/Judge-Slashes-Fees-Offers-Primer-on-Billing-in-Cookbook-Case 
[https://perma.cc/MK7D-TPP8]; Will You Take My Case for a Flat Fee?, LAW OFFICES JOHN 
L. DODD & ASSOCIATES, http://www.appellate-law.com/Questions/FlatContinFee.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4L9M-3N6N] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) (noting how an appeal may take 
over 120 billable hours to complete). 
 74. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:17 (noting that in recent years class action 
recovery has totaled over $33 billion, much of which was through settlements). 
 75. See id. § 1:18; Fitzpatrick, supra note 71, at 814 (demonstrating that such plaintiffs’ 
attorneys annually received $5 billion from 2006 through 2009); Coe, supra note 67 (noting 
how corporate law firm partners may bill over $1000 per hour); Doug Greene, The Root Cause 
of Skyrocketing Class Action Defense Costs, LANE POWELL (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/09/09/the-root-cause-of-skyrocketing-securities-class-
action-defense-costs/ [https://perma.cc/555Y-MADS] (noting how a corporate defense law 
firm could collect over $20 million in fees during a Rule 23 action). 
 76. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:18. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 75. 
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23 suit may be simultaneously quite lucrative or expensive depending on the 
party.79  Naturally, however, these costs dramatically increase when judicial 
inconsistencies cause litigant uncertainty.80 
The Rule’s significant impact has even led the U.S. Supreme Court to 
strive for increased analytic clarity.81  Nevertheless, such uniformity has been 
elusive when courts have analyzed overbreadth at the class certification 
stage.82  So, Rule 23’s class certification requirements must be broken down 
individually to better gauge this issue and to further comprehend how much 
confusion arises. 
1.  The Rule 23 Class Certification Requirements 
The existence of broad judicial discretion at the class certification stage 
furthers the risk of inconsistent analysis.83  And yet, such discretion is 
necessary due to Rule 23’s broad scope.84  As a result, it is vital to fully 
understand the class certification requirements85 to determine how such 
discretion may be properly exercised.86 
For courts to grant class certification, plaintiffs must satisfy all relevant 
Rule 23 requirements.87  The first hurdle is Rule 23(a).88  Specifically, Rule 
23(a) requires (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and 
(4) adequacy.89  Once the plaintiff class meets the Rule 23(a) requirements, 
it must then fit into one of Rule 23(b)’s three subcategories.90 
Certainly, the class action best serves its intended function when the 
consolidated claims would otherwise have been too numerous to be 
individually litigated or joined together.91  Thus, Rule 23(a)(1) mandates a 
sufficiently numerous class.92  The requirement, however, does not provide 
a clear formula or “magic number.”93  Nonetheless, proposed classes of fewer 
than twenty members ordinarily do not satisfy Rule 23(a)(1).94 
Like Rule 23(a)(1), the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement focuses 
on ensuring the protection of absent class members.95  Rule 23(a)(2) requires 
 
 79. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 80. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 81. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 82. See infra Part I.C. 
 83. See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1897 (2014). 
 84. See id. at 1947. 
 85. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2394. 
 86. See Wolff, supra note 83, at 1897. 
 87. See 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 7:1. 
 88. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2366. 
 89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 90. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2366. 
 91. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1:2. 
 92. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2366. 
 93. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 591 (3d Cir. 2012); 
1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 3:11. 
 94. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 3:11. 
 95. See id. § 1:2. 
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that a common question of law or fact exist among the class.96  Hence, 
analysis of this requirement demands quantitative assessments of common 
versus individualized questions.97  Justice Antonin Scalia excogitated this 
point in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.98  To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), he noted, 
claims “must depend upon a common contention of such a nature that it is 
capable of class wide resolution.”99  Thus, the commonality requirement is 
rarely contentious.100 
Alternatively, the final two requirements under Rule 23(a)—typicality and 
adequacy—address essential qualifications for class representatives.101  To 
satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), a representative’s claims and defenses must be typical 
of those of the class.102  This is needed so that the representative’s interests 
align with the interests of those who he or she aims to litigate on behalf of.103  
Similarly, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that a class representative adequately 
represents the interests of his or her class.104  This adequacy requirement 
legitimatizes Rule 23’s binding effect in the absence of class members 
litigating individually.105  Here, class representatives are mandated to pursue 
the class’s interests.106 
As stated, classes must fit into one of Rule 23(b)’s three subcategories once 
the Rule 23(a) prerequisites are satisfied.107  Rule 23(b)(1), an infrequently 
invoked provision, deems classes appropriate where separate actions would 
likely produce inconsistent adjudications.108  In turn, Rule 23(b)(2) creates a 
remedy in the form of injunctive relief.109  Rule 23(b)(2) classes may be 
certified where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class.”110  Notably, due to these 
distinctive characteristics, Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) actions contain 
mandatory classes111 that absent members may not opt out of.112  
Alternatively, Rule 23(b)(3) actions are not mandatory and potential 
claimants may opt out.113  This distinction in opt-out rights exists because 
individualized monetary relief—the remedy offered by Rule 23(b)(3)—
 
 96. See id. § 3:18. 
 97. See 6 THOMAS SMITH & ELIZABETH WILLIAMS, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 
§ 23:17 (3d ed. 2015). 
 98. 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011). 
 99. See id. at 338, 350. 
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 109. See Luks, supra note 16, at 2367. 
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produces the potential for claimants to be unjustly forced into such 
litigation.114 
Alas, the need for an opt-out provision is just one example of the unique 
concerns associated with Rule 23(b)(3)’s remedy.115  The overbreadth issue 
represents another.116  Generally, this issue does not relate to Rule 23(b)(2) 
suits because the existence of uninjured claimants is largely irrelevant where 
class-wide injunctive relief is sought.117  Only in Rule 23(b)(3) actions, 
where heightened class cohesion is required for certification, does the 
overbreadth problem truly manifest.118  These concerns with respect to class 
cohesion for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification led to the addition of 
supplementary procedural protections119 in the form of predominance and 
ascertainability.120  Oddly, though, the predominance and ascertainability 
requirements often remain intertwined.121 
2.  The Predominance Requirement 
Understanding the predominance requirement is essential to 
comprehending the problems associated with its inconsistent application 
during overbreadth analysis.  To satisfy Rule 23(b)(3), common questions of 
law or fact must predominate over individualized inquiries such that the class 
action is superior to separate actions.122  Thus, this predominance 
requirement demands qualitative analysis.123  Common issues must not 
merely exist in a Rule 23(b)(3) class as is required by Rule 23(a)(2).124  
Rather, common issues must outweigh individualized issues.125  
Consequently, the commonality and predominance requirements may be 
analyzed congruently.126 
The hallmark of this predominance question is whether a common form of 
liability exists among the proposed class members.127  Indeed, the 
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requirement may be satisfied even where individualized damage calculations 
are necessary.128  But no exact equation exists.129  So, while some courts 
have held that damage variances may predominate over common liability 
issues,130 others have held that variations in applicable law may outweigh 
relevant commonalities.131 
To ease such tension, courts have applied a two-step predominance test.132  
First, the “characterization” step distinguishes common questions from 
individualized questions133 by sorting the issues that are “susceptible to 
class-wide proof.”134  Second, these courts then loosely compare the relevant 
evidence to determine which issues predominate.135  However, this test 
remains imperfect as it is conducted by judges exercising their own 
discretion.136  And, as alluded to, because judges utilize discretion when 
analyzing class certification, fewer factors to analyze may actually produce 
more consistent results.137 
In sum, predominant common issues effectively establish a class-wide 
right to recovery.138  Take, for example, two potential suits brought by the 
female employees of a retail store.139  These suits generally allege that the 
employer paid its male employees more than its female employees in similar 
positions.  Suit one involves a proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class140 in which the 
female employees seek damages from the employer to remedy their salary 
disparity.  Suit two involves a proposed Rule 23(b)(2) class141 that seeks 
injunctive relief to halt the employer’s discriminatory practices. 
In suit one, the class members must be similarly situated for the 
consolidation of their claims to be effective.142  Otherwise, many class 
members may be granted unwarranted damages.143  This occurrence would 
also potentially subject the defendant to unjust liability.144  However, in suit 
two, major dissimilarities between the class members could prove 
irrelevant.145  Here, due to the absence of individualized relief, a class-wide 
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injunction with respect to the employer’s discrimination would likely not 
induce injustice.146 
Accordingly, common questions must predominate in Rule 23(b)(3) 
classes to ensure the existence of similarly situated members.147  The mere 
existence of a common fact, like employment at the same retail store, is 
insufficient to cure these associated risks.148  Nevertheless, the satisfaction 
of the predominance requirement is useless where class members remain 
unascertainable.149  Litigants must be able to identify the claimants from the 
class definition with certainty.150  Precise class definitions based on reference 
to objective criteria bridge the gap between cohesive classes in theory and 
cohesive classes in reality.151 
3.  The Ascertainability Requirement 
The ascertainability requirement is the leading alternative to predominance 
for framing overbreadth analysis at the Rule 23(b)(3) class certification 
stage.152  However, ascertainability is not explicitly within Rule 23’s class 
certification requirements.153  Instead, it developed from the needs of both 
courts and litigants.154  As for courts, they particularly require plaintiffs to 
satisfy the ascertainability requirement to secure their ability to identify the 
potential class members.155  Naturally, courts only grant certification for 
objectively workable classes.156 
For claimants, a need for the ascertainability requirement flowed from 
abovementioned opt-out provision.157  Judge Richard Posner explained that 
the reason “for allowing opting out in [23(b)(3)] class action[s] is that even 
though one class member’s claim may overlap [with] another’s (common 
issues), it may be different in respects that makes [class members] want to 
bring [their] own suit.”158  As a result, class members who do not opt out of 
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the litigation are bound by its proceedings.159  However, these individuals 
are not bound when inadequately notified.160 
Of course, adequate notice is impossible where a claimant is unsure 
whether he or she is included in a class definition.161  Consequently, class 
representatives need to be able to identify the class members from the 
proposed class definition with certainty.162  Ideally, the ascertainability 
requirement alleviates the risk that claimants will be unknowingly forced into 
litigation.163 
Likewise, this requirement protects defendants.164  For them, unclear class 
definitions generate concerns of finality as claimants may be subsequently 
released from the results of the litigation165 and therefore free to bring similar 
individual actions.166  This potential for inconsistent liability contravenes 
Rule 23’s purpose.167  Accordingly, Rule 23(b)(3) class certification 
fundamentally requires the satisfaction of the ascertainability requirement. 
Rule 23’s advisory committee168 even consented to this implicit 
requirement.169  Courts have also widely demonstrated their approval since 
the requirement’s introduction.170  But, there is no “universally agreed upon” 
documented source for its authority.171  While some find ascertainability to 
be implicit within Rule 23(a),172 others find authority for this requirement in 
Rule 23(c)(1)(b)’s demand for classes to be sufficiently defined.173  
Unsurprisingly, this incongruence has produced a controversial circuit 
split.174 
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Many circuits analyze the requirement through two prongs.175  The first 
prong, which almost all circuits apply,176 requires precise class definitions 
based on objective criteria.177  The second prong calls for an administratively 
feasible method for the court to determine which exact individuals are 
members of the proposed class.178  Unlike the first prong, courts do not 
unanimously apply the second prong.179 
A recent class action illuminates this split.180  In this New York case, a 
class of individuals alleged that the defendant falsely advertised a product 
that the class members had all recently purchased.181  The first prong of the 
ascertainability requirement would have been satisfied because the class was 
objectively defined.182  Yet, the ascertainability requirement would likely 
have not been met in jurisdictions that apply the second prong because many 
proposed claimants did not have receipts for the purchased products and, 
therefore, could not have definitively proven their membership in the 
class.183 
The second prong’s heightened ascertainability ideal attempts to guarantee 
the protection of litigants’ rights.184  Nonetheless, opponents feel that this 
prong goes “too far” as it may enable defendants to limit their purchaser 
records or otherwise circumvent potential liability.185  The circuits do agree, 
however, that three types of classes fail this requirement’s first prong:  (1) 
“subjective” classes, (2) “vague” classes, and (3) “fail-safe” classes.186  
Inspecting these three types of classes may help demonstrate whether 
overbroad classes similarly fail ascertainability’s first prong. 
First, a subjective class definition187 references its members’ mental 
states.188  This occurs, for example, where claimants are defined as 
“offended” or “deceived.”189  Such “subjective” members are, inherently, not 
objectively identifiable.190 
Second, vague class definitions similarly fail the ascertainability 
requirement.191  A class that defines its members as “bald,” for example, is 
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considered vague.192  In this example, while one may think that one person 
has hair, another may consider that same person to be bald.193  Thus, these 
classes remain potentially boundless.194 
Third, fail-safe classes, those defined by their success on the merits, also 
fail ascertainability’s first prong.195  This type of definition may include all 
individuals who were “wrongfully” denied something by a defendant.196  In 
this scenario, claimants were either “wrongfully” denied something, which 
guarantees them relief, or were not “wrongfully” denied something, which 
makes them unbound to the litigation.197 
Accordingly, these three types of class definitions make adequate notice 
to relevant class members cumbersome.198  Courts, however, may actually 
deny class certification in such instances because these definitions impede 
their ability to objectively identify the injured class members.199  Remember, 
the chief purpose of the implicit ascertainability requirement is to provide the 
legitimate potential class members—those that are legally injured—with 
adequate notice as to who else is a legitimate member of the potential class.  
Only then may a legitimate class member be fully informed as to whether he 
or she intends to opt out of the class.  Perhaps, for example, a legitimate class 
member does not want to be in a class with a certain group of individuals.  
So, while overbroad class definitions may be objectively defined such that 
the entire proposed class may be identified, it still presents the problem that 
the legitimate members, those that will not be rooted out at a later stage in 
the litigation, remain indistinguishable from the illegitimate members, those 
that will be rooted out at a later stage in the litigation.  Hence, it may be 
argued that in this scenario the legitimate class members are not provided 
adequate notice from the class definition to make a reasoned decision with 
respect to their opt out rights.200 
C.  The Overbreadth Issue at Rule 23’s Class Certification Stage 
The existence of uninjured class members at Rule 23(b)(3)’s class 
certification stage causes many problems for litigants.201  Classes defined too 
broadly include “a great number of members who for some reason could not 
have been harmed by the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.”202  This 
manifestation, however, must be distinguished from classes that contain 
members who “could have been harmed, but arguably might not have been 
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for one reason or another.”203  So, overbroad classes include the former:  
uninjured claimants who do not deserve the chance to recover.204  The 
existence of these uninjured class members threatens to dilute relief for 
legitimate claimants and creates the potential for defendants to be unjustly 
found liable for meritless claims.205  Additionally, such overbreadth inhibits 
a court’s ability to objectively identify the rightful claimants.206 
In practice, overbreadth arises in many types of Rule 23(b)(3) actions.207  
A claim involving the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) is 
illustrative.208  Under the TCPA, a consumer has a cause of action when he 
or she receives automated phone calls that he or she had not consented to.209  
Hence, a class definition that includes all persons who received automated 
phone calls from defendants210 may, for example, be overbroad as any class 
member who consented to the phone calls had given up his or her right to 
sue.211 
Courts split when adjudicating this narrow issue.  Importantly, the 
Supreme Court has not provided guidance for lower courts and it recently 
punted on deciding whether Rule 23(b)(3) classes may be certified where 
some uninjured members exist.212  Consequently, class certification may be 
warranted for marginally overbroad classes.213  Class certification in these 
instances may encourage justice to the class’s majority and only subject 
defendants to minimal illegitimate liability.  Moreover, some circuits have 
indicated that marginally overbroad classes may be certified because the 
uninjured class members may be displaced at later stages of the litigation.214  
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This type of class action, while not perfect, may still be superior to other 
forms of litigation.215  Other circuits disagree.216  These courts contend that 
uninjured class members may not be included in certified classes217 because, 
among other issues, such individuals have insufficient Article III standing.218 
Nonetheless, every circuit denies class certification219 for irreparably 
overbroad class definitions.220  The actual analysis remains flexible221 as 
many courts have inconsistently applied Rule 23’s class certification 
requirements when this issue has arisen.222  Some have treated overbreadth 
as a predominance issue because the requirement’s hallmark is a common 
form of liability.223  Others, however, have analyzed overbreadth under the 
ascertainability requirement due to concerns regarding an inability to identify 
legitimate claimants.224  And, irrespective of past class certification results, 
this inconsistency has resulted in litigant confusion.225  This veil of 
uncertainty, of course, is something the Rule 23 advisory committee sought 
to avoid.226 
Consider recent class actions in the Seventh Circuit, where overbreadth is 
alternatively analyzed under predominance and ascertainability 
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requirements.227  In 2011228 and 2013,229 for example, courts there chose to 
analyze overbreadth under the ascertainability requirement.  Alternatively, in 
2015230 and 2016,231 the same courts insisted that these prior decisions were 
too stringent.232  The Seventh Circuit even stipulated that the ascertainability 
requirement was “susceptible to misinterpretation” and clarified that only 
vague, subjective, and fail-safe classes should fail ascertainability’s first 
prong.233  Nonetheless, two separate district courts in the same circuit 
subsequently analyzed overbreadth under the ascertainability inquiry and 
held that the issue was indeed directly related to the implicit requirement’s 
first prong.234  Clearly, due in part to such inconsistency, litigants in the 
Seventh Circuit have been subjected to unpredictable overbreadth 
analysis.235 
The next Part discusses the two distinct causes of inconsistent overbreadth 
analysis at the Rule 23(b)(3) class certification stage.236  First, many courts 
prefer to analyze overbreadth under either predominance or ascertainability 
due to supported policy reasons.237  Second, other courts merely acquiesce 
to how litigants frame their overbreadth arguments—whether under 
predominance or ascertainability—without explaining their reasoning.238 
II.  THE JUDICIAL DIVIDE ON OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS AND THE 
RESULTANT INEFFECTIVE LITIGATION 
As detailed, the inconsistent application of Rule 23(b)(3)’s class 
certification requirements may produce uncertainty in litigation.  This Part 
describes examples of case law that demonstrate how litigants may be 
adversely affected by this uncertainty.  Part II.A focuses on examples that 
derive from divergent judicial preferences for either ascertainability or 
predominance; Part II.B spotlights examples that derive from seemingly 
blind judicial acquiescence to litigants’ preferences. 
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A.  Inconsistent Overbreadth Analysis That Derives 
from Divergent Judicial Preferences 
There are genuine explanations for why courts analyze overbreadth under 
either the predominance or ascertainability requirement.  Yet, these policy 
reasons are often contradictory.  Notwithstanding the validity of these 
varying approaches, this inconsistency must be recognized to further 
understand its consequences. 
1.  The Predominance Preference 
Three recent cases particularly illustrate why some courts prefer to analyze 
overbreadth under the predominance requirement:  Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc.,239 
Circle Click Media LLC v. Regus Management Group LLC,240 and 
Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp.241 
a.  The Third Circuit:  Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc. 
Crystal and Bryan Byrd rented a laptop computer from an Aaron’s 
franchisee store, a consumer-electronics lessor, in the summer of 2010.242  
Five months later, an employee from the store went to the Byrds’ home to 
repossess the laptop.243  While at the house, the employee presented 
screenshots of Bryan Byrd’s internet activity.244  Unsurprisingly, the Byrds 
considered the screenshots to be an unauthorized invasion of their privacy.245  
They then brought a Rule 23(b)(3) action against Aaron’s and its franchisee 
store for their alleged violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA).246  Parties are liable under the ECPA when they intentionally 
intercept the contents of an electronic communication.247 
The store obtained these screenshots through spyware that it had installed 
on its computers.248  The Byrds alleged that this spyware accessed their 
laptop 347 times and retrieved information from the computers of nearly 900 
other customers.249  As a result, the Byrds defined the class as all persons, 
and their household members, who “leased and/or purchased” computers 
from the defendants and who had not consented to the spyware 
installation.250 
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The store then argued that the class definition was overbroad because 
many proposed members did not have their communications intercepted by 
the spyware.251  The district court agreed252 and denied class certification 
because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the ascertainability requirement.253  
The court asserted that this requirement was not met, in part, due to its 
inability to “objectively” identify the injured class members.254  Notably, it 
did not analyze Rule 23’s explicit requirements because it felt that 
ascertainability was an “essential prerequisite.”255 
The class appealed, arguing that the district court should not have denied 
class certification on the basis of ascertainability.256  On appeal, the Third 
Circuit did not refute that the class was overbroad.257  However, it indicated 
that the district court erred in its analysis because the class definition “easily” 
met ascertainability’s first prong.258  It stated that all persons referenced in 
the class definition were readily identifiable, which alleviated any notice or 
finality concerns.259  The Third Circuit also clarified that the ascertainability 
requirement does not ask whether the injured members may be objectively 
identified from the uninjured members.260  It noted that “differences between 
the proposed class should be considered within the rubric of the relevant Rule 
23 requirement” and not injected into the ascertainability evaluation.261  
Consequently, it remanded the case for the liability issue to be analyzed under 
the predominance requirement.262 
On remand, the district court did not conflate the Third Circuit’s 
interpretation of ascertainability with Rule 23’s other requirements.263  It 
found that the class sufficiently satisfied the ascertainability requirement.264  
Nonetheless, it held that individualized questions predominated over 
common ones.265  According to the court, the essential element of the claim, 
injury under the ECPA, was not common among the class.266  As a result, it 
found that certification was inappropriate because the liability issue 
presented “difficulties in managing [the] class action.”267  The Byrd litigation 
demonstrates some of the strongest arguments for courts to analyze 
overbreadth under the predominance inquiry. 
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b.  The Ninth Circuit:  Circle Click Media LLC v. 
Regus Management Group LLC 
Circle Click Media is another example of how a district court analyzed 
overbreadth under the predominance inquiry.268  Regus, the defendant, 
operated as a lessor of commercial office space and offered fully equipped 
offices to consumers for an all-inclusive monthly price.269  Regus made 
representations to the plaintiffs that its services were to be agreed to through 
a one-page Office Service Agreement (OSA).270  The controversy here 
originated because the defendant’s invoices allegedly exceeded the amount 
indicated in the OSA via “various mandatory fees disclosed in other 
documents.”271  For example, Circle Click, a plaintiff, finalized an OSA with 
Regus for two offices in San Francisco.272  Circle Click alleged that it “relied 
on Regus’s advertisements indicating Regus offered [office space] . . . for a 
single . . . price.”273  Yet, Circle Click stated that Regus charged 
“significantly more” via additional fees not listed in the OSA.274  
Consequently, Circle Click, and others similarly situated, alleged a myriad 
of claims involving Regus’s fee structure.275  The plaintiffs moved to certify 
two classes, a New York class and a California class, which were both 
defined to include “all persons” who executed agreements with Regus and 
who were exposed to mandatory fees not referenced in the OSA.276 
Notwithstanding the legitimacy of some of the underlying claims, Regus 
argued that the proposed classes, as defined, were overbroad.277  The district 
court agreed.278  The court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the 
predominance requirement even though Regus’s website was “inherently 
applicable to the whole class.”279  In particular, it found that individualized 
questions regarding a common form of liability significantly outweighed 
common contentions.280  Here, because many class members, albeit a 
minority, were not exposed to the allegedly illicit fees, the proposed class 
definitions caused unsalvageable manageability issues.281  Accordingly, the 
court primarily focused on the existence of the illegitimate claimants in its 
predominance analysis.282 
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c. The First Circuit:  Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp. 
The court in Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp. also chose to scrutinize 
overbreadth under the predominance requirement.283  However, in 
Matamoros, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.284 
The Massachusetts Tips Act provides that “wait staff” employees are not 
required to share customer tips with non-“wait staff” employees.285  Here, 
Starbucks’s mandatory employee policy stated that its customer tips were to 
be distributed to both baristas and shift supervisors.286  Under the Tips Act, 
“wait staff” employees, such as the Starbucks baristas, are defined as service 
providers who have “no managerial responsibility.”287  Here, the baristas 
alleged that the shift supervisors did not qualify as “wait staff” employees.288  
As a result, the baristas filed a Rule 23(b)(3) suit against the company for its 
alleged violation of the Tips Act.289 
Starbucks stated that the shift supervisors performed more duties than the 
baristas and were actually “promoted from the ranks of baristas.”290  Due to 
this evidence, the district court ultimately found that the shift supervisors did 
not qualify as “wait staff” employees.291  In doing so, it granted summary 
judgment for the plaintiffs.292  Starbucks then appealed.293  The company 
contended that the district court should not have certified the allegedly 
unascertainable class because “certain experienced baristas” included in the 
class definition had provided “coaching” to less experienced baristas.294  
Therefore, it argued that the class was overbroad because these experienced 
baristas did not qualify as “wait staff” employees.295 
The First Circuit, however, vehemently disagreed.296  It found this 
ascertainability argument to be “frivolous” and stressed that the plaintiffs 
satisfied the inquiry irrespective of the class’s potential overbreadth because 
the class definition precisely defined its members based on objective 
criteria.297  The First Circuit also indicated that this issue was actually better 
suited for the predominance inquiry.298  And, as for this potential 
overbreadth, it held that the baristas who offered assistance did not maintain 
any managerial responsibilities.299  Thus, it found that the plaintiffs satisfied 
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the predominance requirement because Starbucks’s corporate policy, the 
alleged violations of a single statute, and the general job responsibilities of 
the baristas “greatly” outweighed individualized questions.300 
Similar to the courts in Byrd and Circle Click Media, the Matamoros court 
referenced many significant justifications for analyzing overbreadth under 
the predominance requirement.  Part II.A.1.d describes these arguments in 
detail. 
d.  Policy Reasons for the Predominance Preference 
The predominance requirement, in particular, enables Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
effectiveness because it ensures that class members are sufficiently 
similar.301  Naturally, this requirement’s “hallmark” is the finding of a 
common form of liability.302  But a finding of a common form of liability is 
not always dispositive for class certification as courts must balance all 
individualized and common issues.303  While a common form of liability is 
the key to the predominance inquiry, the inquiry still mandates that all 
individualized and common issues must be balanced.  The predominance 
requirement may actually be satisfied when minimal liability issues diverge.  
So, if the overbreadth issue becomes a per se failure under ascertainability 
analysis, then some marginally overbroad classes, which can satisfy the 
predominance requirement, may never get past the class certification 
stage.304 
In practice, marginally overbroad classes may never even reach the 
predominance inquiry in jurisdictions that analyze overbreadth under the 
ascertainability requirement.305  Hence, this type of ascertainability analysis 
essentially makes marginal overbreadth dispositive to the class inquiry.306  
Conversely, when marginal overbreadth is analyzed under the predominance 
inquiry and an objectively defined class definition has already satisfied the 
ascertainability requirement’s first prong, courts will grant class 
certification.307 
2.  The Ascertainability Preference 
Courts that do not choose to analyze overbreadth under the predominance 
requirement frequently scrutinize the issue under the ascertainability 
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requirement.308  When many illegitimate claimants exist, many courts prefer 
the ascertainability inquiry for such analysis because a broadly applied 
predominance requirement may actually increase the risk of judicial error by 
expanding courts’ discretion at the class certification stage.309 
a.  The Seventh Circuit:  Vigus v. Southern Illinois 
Riverboat/Casino Cruises, Inc. 
In Vigus, the defendant company (“Casino Cruises”) regularly called 
members of its loyalty program with prerecorded messages to alert them of 
special offerings.310  The program had over 100,000 members at the time of 
the 2011 litigation.311  As for the program members themselves, the 
defendant noted that only those who had affirmatively provided their 
telephone numbers were added to its call list.312  Yet, Richard Vigus, the 
named plaintiff, stated that he received automated voice messages from 
Casino Cruises to which he had not consented.313  Vigus maintained that he 
was never even a member of the program.314  As noted above, a party is liable 
under the TCPA when it makes automated phone calls to individuals without 
their prior consent.315  Consequently, Vigus brought a Rule 23(b)(3) action 
against Casino Cruises for its alleged violations of the TCPA.316 
Vigus defined the class as all persons who received automated phone calls 
from Casino Cruises.317  This definition, however, made no reference to 
whether its members had consented to the phone calls.318  As a result, Casino 
Cruises argued that the class definition included too many illegitimate 
claimants.319  While Vigus was not a member of the program, many potential 
members had affirmatively provided their telephone numbers to the 
defendant.320  This, of course, eradicated their causes of action.321  For this 
reason, the district court denied class certification.322 
The district court analyzed this overbreadth issue under the ascertainability 
requirement.323  It stated that the plaintiffs had not “sufficiently” crafted the 
class definition “so as to [produce an] identifiable . . . class.”324  The court 
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stated that “the process of determining who fell within such a class could not 
be determined by objective criteria applicable to the class as a whole.”325  In 
asserting this, the court placed great importance on its inability to identify the 
injured members from the class definition.326 
Interestingly, the court continued on with its class certification analysis.327  
On the issue of predominance, it stated that individualized inquiries 
outweighed common ones.328  But, it determined that whether the defendant 
had called any of the legitimate class members was just one factor in this 
analysis.329   
b.  The Eleventh Circuit:  Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc. 
In Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc.,330 the court, alternatively, did not 
undergo any predominance analysis and instead denied class certification 
solely on the basis of ascertainability.331 
Lawrence Walewski adored playing the video game The Elder Scrolls IV:  
Oblivion.332  Walewski loved it so much that he spent roughly 450 hours 
playing during a four-month period.333  At that point, the game allegedly 
malfunctioned so that he was “unable to open doors and gates, cast spells, or 
trigger numerous other animations that were essential.”334  As a result of 
these defects, Walewski felt that the defendants unlawfully represented how 
the game play could go on “indefinitely.”335  He also noted that these defects 
made the game substantially less valuable than the marked purchased 
price.336  Consequently, Walewski filed a Rule 23(b)(3) action against the 
defendants, the game’s developer and studio producer, for their alleged 
violations of consumer-protection laws.337 
The district court held that the class definition, which included all persons 
who purchased the game,338 was substantially overbroad because many 
claimants were never exposed to the alleged defects and the value of the game 
was never diminished for them.339  Moreover, it stated that several claimants 
did not even directly purchase the game.340  Thus, because the court could 
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not identify the injured claimants from the class definition, it denied class 
certification on the basis of ascertainability.341 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision.342  Like the district court, the 
Eleventh Circuit asserted that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the ascertainability 
requirement due to the overbroad class definition.343  Specifically, it held that 
to “cull” the injured class members from millions of other game owners was 
too cumbersome.344  In doing so, it approved of how the district court applied 
the class certification requirements.345 
c.  The Sixth Circuit:  Carter v. PJS of Parma, Inc. 
As opposed to Walewski, Carter v. PJS of Parma, Inc.346 involved a Rule 
23(b)(3) action that pled claims of unjust enrichment.347  The defendants in 
Carter, PJS of Parma and Lorraine Stancato, owned and operated Stancato’s 
Italian Restaurant in Ohio.348  They also maintained an off-site catering 
service and hired banquet servers—the plaintiffs—to staff the events.349  For 
catering payments, the restaurant charged its customers for food and drinks 
as well as a “banquet service charge.”350  These service charges did not 
constitute tips.351  However, customers often provided additional tips to the 
restaurant, which it was then required to distribute to the servers.352  Several 
of the servers alleged that the restaurant had not distributed many of the due 
tips.353  In turn, the plaintiffs defined their proposed class as all banquet 
servers who worked for the defendants.354 
A district court subsequently denied class certification in part because the 
proposed class definition was substantially overbroad.355  This particular 
class was overbroad because many of the included servers were not the 
intended recipients of certain customer tips.356  Thus, as the court indicated, 
the defendants could not have been “unjustly enriched” at the expense of 
these uninjured class members.357  As for the class certification requirements, 
the court stated that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the ascertainability inquiry 
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because the class definition included too many uninjured members.358  The 
court further noted that the requirement failed because this definition 
inhibited its ability to identify the legitimate claimants.359 
The court also held that the class “easily” failed to satisfy the 
predominance requirement because fact-specific questions outweighed 
common contentions.360  But, it did not frame this inquiry as an overbreadth 
problem.361  Rather, the court focused on other individualized inquiries—
such as which severs worked at which banquets, if many customer tips were 
intended for individual banquet servers, and which factors motivated the 
customer tips.362  Accordingly, Vigus, Walewski, and Carter exemplify why 
many courts analyze overbreadth under the ascertainability requirement. 
d.  Policy Reasons for the Ascertainability Preference 
The ascertainability requirement is where courts query the suitability of 
class definitions for pending Rule 23(b)(3) litigation.363  Of course, a 
substantially overbroad class definition is particularly unsuitable for such 
litigation due to the inevitable necessity for individualized inquiries.364  The 
ascertainability requirement also helps to ensure that class definitions enable 
adequate notice for litigants.365  And, as stated above, overbroad class 
definitions impair such notice.366  Thus, many feel that claimants may be 
unknowingly forced into litigation and defendants may be subjected to 
possible interminable liability when the overbreadth issue is not scrutinized 
under this requirement.367  So, perhaps, overbreadth scrutiny under the 
ascertainability inquiry may ensure that legitimate claimants remain 
objectively identifiable throughout the course of litigation.368 
There are, however, deficiencies in this line of reasoning.369  First, the 
appearance of conflating the explicit requirements of Rule 23(a) with the 
implicit requirement of ascertainability is inherently troublesome.370  
Second, this broad interpretation of ascertainability may lead to the disposal 
of many actions where marginal overbreadth exists.371  Third, perhaps 
overbreadth alone does not inhibit adequate notice.372  Overbreadth, in fact, 
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may only hamper a litigant’s ability to categorize the injured members from 
an otherwise objectively identifiable class.373 
3.  The Resultant Unnecessary Litigation Costs 
and the Potential for Forum Shopping 
Further examination of two of the cases analyzed above—Byrd and 
Walewski—illustrates how divergent analytical preferences for overbreadth 
analysis may expose litigants to unnecessary litigation costs and the potential 
for forum shopping.374 
a.  The Unnecessary Litigation Costs 
Revisiting the Byrd and Walewski litigations is necessary to comprehend 
how the overbreadth issue leads to unnecessary costs for litigants.  In Byrd, 
the district court denied class certification on the basis of ascertainability due 
to irreparable overbreadth.375  Then, following the plaintiffs’ appeal, the 
circuit court remanded the case for the overbreadth issue to be analyzed under 
the predominance requirement.376  Finally, after three years of litigation, a 
district court once again denied class certification.377  This time, however, 
the court did so under the predominance inquiry.378 
All parties were subjected to more than three years of avoidable motion 
practice and briefing.379  In 2014, for example, after class certification was 
initially denied, the plaintiffs were forced to explain how the district court 
erred in its ascertainability analysis.380  In this brief, the plaintiffs primarily 
detailed how the district court misinterpreted its circuit’s precedent regarding 
the requirement’s satisfaction.381  They noted that “the implicit requirement 
of ascertainability [had been] met” when similarly situated plaintiffs had 
objectively defined their classes.382  In sum, they argued that whether they 
could have recovered on the merits of the claims was “not an appropriate 
inquiry in the context of evaluating” ascertainability.383 
Following this, the defendants asserted that the district court had indeed 
correctly denied class certification on the basis of ascertainability because 
the proposed class definition was “overbroad.”384  Though, in response, the 
plaintiffs countered that the defendants had likewise misinterpreted the 
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ascertainability requirement.385  Here, the plaintiffs cited another case from 
within the Third Circuit that indicated that the inquiry generally does not 
involve an examination of a common form of liability.386  They next directed 
that this problem should have instead been analyzed under the predominance 
requirement because their class definition did not need to “include elements” 
of their claims.387  Accordingly, this prolonged back and forth exhibits just 
some of the preventable litigation that has resulted from this circuit’s 
inconsistency in overbreadth analysis.388 
Like in Byrd, Walewski involved preventable litigation over the 
overbreadth issue.389  However, unlike in Byrd, the circuit court affirmed the 
denial of class certification.390  In Walewski, a magistrate judge initially 
recommended that class certification be denied because the proposed class 
was overbroad and unascertainable.391  Walewski, the plaintiff, immediately 
objected to this report and cited several cases from within the same circuit to 
dispute the judge’s reasoning.392  Among many challenges, he argued that 
his class definition satisfied the ascertainability requirement because “the 
Court can readily and objectively ascertain whether any individual is a 
member of the proposed class through a single inquiry:  whether the 
consumer purchased a copy [of the game].”393  Correspondingly, he noted 
that the potential overbreadth should have instead been analyzed under the 
predominance requirement.394 
The defendants, of course, agreed with the magistrate judge’s preliminary 
recommendation.395  Their initial brief similarly consisted of several pages 
devoted to applicable precedent.396  However, as opposed to Walewski, they 
cited cases from within the circuit to demonstrate that the ascertainability 
requirement is not met when substantial overbreadth exists because such 
class definitions inhibit a court’s ability to identify injured claimants.397  
Later on, unfortunately for Walewski, the circuit court agreed with the 
defendants’ reasoning and affirmed the denial of class certification.398 
 
 385. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 1, 9, Byrd, 784 F.3d 154 (No. 14-3050). 
 386. See id. at 6–7. 
 387. See id. at 8. 
 388. See supra text accompanying notes 263–70. 
 389. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 38, Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 502 
F. App’x 857 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-11843); Joint Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 22, 
Walewski, 502 F. App’x 857. 
 390. See Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 861–62. 
 391. See Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-1178-ORL-28DAB, 2012 WL 
834125, at *4–6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 847236 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 
2012), aff’d, 502 F. App’x 857. 
 392. See Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s January 30, 2012 Report and 
Recommendation at 1, 8–10, Walewski, 2012 WL 847236 (No. 11-cv-01178), ECF No. 55. 
 393. Id. at 9. 
 394. See id. 
 395. See Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 
and Recommendation at 1, Walewski, 2012 WL 847236 (No. 11-cv-01178), ECF No. 57. 
 396. See id. at 3–7. 
 397. See id. at 4. 
 398. See Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 861 (11th Cir. 2012). 
2018] CLASS PROBLEM! 283 
Rule 23 litigation is very expensive for litigants.399  Yet, as just described, 
the Byrd and Walewski cases present examples when this litigation may be 
unnecessarily costly.400  The plaintiffs’ attorneys, for example, squandered 
their time litigating the overbreadth issue.401  And their time is valuable 
because these attorneys typically work on contingencies.402  Similarly, the 
defendants were likely excessively billed for this same preventable litigation.  
So, these examples plainly demonstrate how inconsistent overbreadth 
analysis materializes in needless costs.  These added litigation costs may also 
create a potential for forum shopping.403 
b.  The Potential for Forum Shopping 
Forum shopping is unfair because similarly situated parties should not be 
subjected to inconsistent opportunities and costs in litigation based on the 
forum.404  For an illustration of this point, consider the plaintiffs in Byrd and 
Walewski.  They may have only been able to bring their suits in one 
jurisdiction.405  If so, then these parties had to remain in forums that had 
wavered on overbreadth.406  Conversely, other, similarly situated plaintiffs 
may have been able to choose between multiple forums.  These other 
plaintiffs would have presumably chosen forums that had consistently 
analyzed overbreadth to avoid this potential for preventable litigation.407  
Thus, under this scenario, the Byrd and Walewski plaintiffs would have been 
subjected to disproportionate costs merely because of procedural 
technicalities.408 
It is understandable why plaintiffs would forum shop under these 
circumstances.409  Though, as the next section explains, other courts have not 
demonstrated one specific preference for where overbreadth should be 
analyzed at the class certification stage.410  Instead, many courts have blindly 
acquiesced to litigants’ analytical structures.411 
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B.  Inconsistent Overbreadth Analysis That Derives 
from Judicial Acquiescence 
This Note describes how litigant confusion persists where courts analyze 
overbreadth in divergent ways.  Naturally, this same confusion also persists 
when courts acquiesce to defendants’ imprecise overbreadth arguments.  
Jamison v. First Credit Services412 and PB Property Management Group 
LLC v. Goodman Manufacturing,413 described below, demonstrate how such 
confusion likewise leads to unnecessary litigation costs and the potential for 
forum shopping. 
1.  The Resultant Unnecessary Litigation Costs 
Jamison presents another example where a district court denied class 
certification for an action under the TCPA, in part, due to an overbroad class 
definition.414  The court in Jamison, however, addressed many of the issues 
“as they were framed” by the defendant because it agreed that there was a 
“substantial overlap” between the ascertainability and predominance 
requirements.415  As a result, the court acquiesced to the defendant and 
exclusively analyzed overbreadth under the ascertainability inquiry.416 
Following this denial of class certification, the plaintiffs asked the court to 
reconsider.417  They particularly asserted that the court “misapprehended the 
facts”418 because the proposed class was indeed ascertainable.419  They also 
cited cases within the circuit to show that the potential overbreadth should 
have been analyzed under the predominance requirement.420  In turn, the 
plaintiffs extensively detailed how these two inquiries are meant to be quite 
distinct.421 
Still, the court denied this request for reconsideration.422  It did not explain 
why the predominance and ascertainability requirements “overlapped” so as 
to allow for interchangeable overbreadth analysis.423  Instead, the court 
similarly repeated the defendant’s ascertainability arguments without 
addressing many of the plaintiffs’ main objections.424  Consequently, the 
plaintiffs may have been inhibited from properly asserting their 
predominance arguments solely because of the apparent deference.425  Courts 
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that demonstrate such unconcern towards precision have enabled superfluous 
litigation in the long run.426 
PB Property Management presents another example.427  Like in Jamison, 
the plaintiffs in PB Property Management filed a motion to certify a Rule 
23(b)(3) action.428  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, a manufacturer 
of air conditioning and heating system components, knew of several defects 
in its products that regularly led to leakage and necessary repairs.429  Yet, 
notwithstanding this potential deception, a district court ultimately denied the 
motion.430  It did so by way of acceding to the defendant’s claims regarding 
the ascertainability and predominance requirements.431  Specifically, the 
court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy both of these requirements 
because the proposed class definition was substantially overbroad.432  The 
court, however, did not explain why it felt that the defendant had correctly 
framed the overbreadth issue in this duplicative manner.433 
In its opposition to the motion for class certification, the defendant had 
argued overbreadth under the ascertainability requirement.434  It noted that 
the existence of a substantial number of claimants who had never been 
exposed to the alleged defects mandated a denial of class certification.435  In 
support of this ascertainability assertion, it cited Walewski and several other 
cases.436  Next, the defendant devoted almost a dozen pages to the 
predominance inquiry.437  Both arguments equally consisted of contentions 
regarding the existence of the uninjured class members.438  As for the 
requirement itself, the defendant asserted that “individualized inquiries” 
regarding a common form of liability “overwhelm[ed] any common 
questions.”439  While the word “overbroad” was not used here as it was 
within the ascertainability section, the arguments remained practically 
identical.440 
Following these repetitious contentions, the plaintiffs responded by noting 
that the defendant was “simply wrong” because whether “some members did 
not experience the [alleged] problem” was no reason to deny class 
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certification under the ascertainability requirement.441  Instead, they 
suggested that these liability questions were best evaluated under the 
predominance inquiry.442  Nevertheless, many of these assertions proved 
needless as the court subsequently demonstrated its support of the 
defendant’s imprecise arguments443 at the expense of succinct analysis.444 
The overbreadth issue in this case and in Jamison could have been 
sufficiently framed under one Rule 23 requirement.445  Because these courts 
chose not to, the plaintiffs’ attorneys wasted their valuable time and the 
defendants were likely exposed to unnecessary monetary costs.446 
2.  The Resultant Potential for Forum Shopping 
As demonstrated above, these unnecessary litigation costs may lead to 
forum shopping.447  To illustrate, consider that the plaintiffs in Jamison and 
PB Property Management may have been unable to choose between multiple 
forums for their respective Rule 23(b)(3) suits.448  If true, then these plaintiffs 
were forced to litigate in courts that had demonstrated imprecise overbreadth 
analysis.449  Alternatively, similarly situated plaintiffs may have been able to 
select separate forums that had not previously acquiesced to defendants’ 
imprecise analytical structures.  Thus, in this scenario, the Jamison and PB 
Property Management plaintiffs would have been subjected to redundant 
overbreadth litigation and unnecessary costs solely due to their inability to 
forum shop.450  Conversely, the latter plaintiffs would not have been exposed 
to these superfluous costs if they had chosen to forum shop in this manner.451 
Accordingly, it is clear that the overbreadth issue results in inefficient and 
unfair consequences for involved litigants.452  Fortunately, as Part III next 
describes, a feasible solution exists:  courts must consistently apply the 
predominance requirement during overbreadth analysis at the class 
certification stage in Rule 23(b)(3) suits. 
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III.  COURTS SHOULD CONSISTENTLY APPLY THE PREDOMINANCE 
REQUIREMENT DURING OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS 
AT RULE 23’S CLASS CERTIFICATION STAGE 
This Note centers on an often-overlooked issue within the federal courts 
and exposes its resultant detrimental consequences for litigants.  A solution 
is highly attainable.  Consider the current circuit split on ascertainability.453  
That issue implicates judicial disagreements as to the result of Rule 23 class 
certification.454   Alternatively, courts unanimously agree that irreparably 
overbroad classes should be denied class certification.455  Here, the issue 
simply exists due to differing rationales for class certification analysis.456  
Thus, due to the issue’s nature, courts have the ability to harmonize their 
actions to avoid the aforementioned ineffective litigation. 
To further this point, it is important to revisit the issue’s context.  First, 
this Note explained how Rule 23’s class certification requirements need to 
be consistently applied for effectiveness.457  Then, Part II presented examples 
of the overbreadth issue to show how inconsistent analysis at the class 
certification stage may indeed result in unnecessary litigation costs and the 
potential for forum shopping.458  In doing so, this Note displayed why courts 
need to adopt one standard for overbreadth analysis irrespective of which 
class certification requirement is the “correct” one. 
Regardless of this general need for uniformity, the predominance inquiry 
is the optimal analytical approach as each requirement under Rule 23 fulfills 
distinct goals.459  The explicit predominance requirement, for example, 
ensures that sufficient similarities exist between class members to ensure that 
the consolidation of claims remains superior to alternate forms of 
litigation.460  Of course, the hallmark of similarities between claimants is a 
common form of liability—as individualized inquiries inherently do not 
predominate where class members share the same injury.461  Thus, it is 
apparent that overbreadth scrutiny falls neatly within the requirement’s 
framework and actually encourages analytic clarity.462 
In contrast, the ascertainability requirement does not truly relate to this 
overbreadth concern.  As stated, it simply mandates objective class 
definitions so that proposed members may be identified.463  This implicit 
requirement ensures that people are properly protected from potentially 
duplicative litigation.464  In particular, a plaintiff’s satisfaction of this 
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requirement allows for adequate notice.465  As explained above, objectively 
defined classes that are overbroad may still satisfy the requirement when all 
class members remain identifiable.466  Hence, overbreadth analysis is not 
within ascertainability’s scope.  Accordingly, to fix the issue, the 
predominance requirement must be uniformly adopted and consistently 
applied.  It is also fundamental that courts appreciate the need for uniformity 
when applying the FRCP. 
CONCLUSION 
The inconsistency of overbreadth analysis at Rule 23’s class certification 
stage can be attributed to a variety of causes.467  This general inconsistency 
has resulted in widespread ineffective litigation.468  And, as explained in this 
Note, the Rule’s large footprint on society has only intensified such negative 
ramifications.  To remedy this inconsistency, courts should unanimously 
apply the predominance requirement to promote the Rule’s effectiveness.  
The failure to fix this issue further creates litigant uncertainty and, as 
explored above, can subject parties to superfluous legal costs and 
unnecessary delays at the class certification stage.  These sorts of potential 
problems could be avoided if courts uniformly adopt one form of analysis.  
Although this issue has only a limited effect on class certification results, it 
is vital to capitalize on any opportunity that helps encourage efficiency and 
fairness within our legal system. 
 
 465. See supra text accompanying note 365. 
 466. See supra text accompanying note 260. 
 467. See supra Part II. 
 468. See supra Part II. 
